Tuesday, March 18, 2008

DIME, COIN and the National toolkit: Global COIN - pt. 3

Cross-posted from Dumb Looks Still Free as a standalone piece for The Jacksonian Party.

The following is considered a 'rough draft' or 'working paper'.

From the Field Manual FM3-24 Counterinsurgency manual:

1-1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group’s ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.

1-2. Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1- 02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.
These outlooks give us a context for local insurgency on a localized scale, but does it offer a paradigm for translating modern events into a global scale?

To examine and define this the concept of 'constituted government' is a main stumbling block as there is no constituted global government at the global scale with anything like a constitution. What there is, however, is a set of systems that arise from having States, be they City States or Nation States, especially when there is contact between States. If 'constituted government' is the idea of government formed to meet a set of needs by those under it, then that constitution (be it written or unwritten) is the description of the means of how such government is allowed to act. Thus 'constituted government' is a description of that process of running affairs at that higher level of the State as opposed to purely local or municipal government interested in sub-State affairs. This is not only not unknown, but has been regularized in the 9th through 18th centuries via a concept known as the law of nations. What is the law of nations?

By having States and having to address both sub-State and State-to-State concerns there arises a need for functions to address these concerns. We are typically used to the form of State government that addresses us, as individuals, on the internal side of things as the State represents those within it, no matter what form of government it has. Thus from absolute dictatorship or totalitarian government all the way to representative democracy or direct democracy are the internal limits for how States may run their internal affairs. Externally, however, things are not as wide ranging as attempts to shift ruling government beyond the borders of a State bring that State into contact with other States who are often hostile to such changes. By the very act of having such a State and having contact the law of nations arises as the means to create such contact and regularize it. While the law of nations is 'voluntary law' on the actual citation of it as a ruling internal concept or for creating civil law, it is less than voluntary on the external side as other States are working to ensure that any any other State adheres to its agreements.

With that understanding it is very possible to instantiate that there is 'constituted government' at an international scale, and that it is a flat or non-hierarchical form of government: there is no higher law to appeal to than the law of nations. One could, in theory, have a State in absolute isolation and never need the law of nations as a concept, but the moment a State meets up with another State the law of nations appears. A State may not like nor want such a law of nations, but by being a State that is what it gets as part of its make-up. Just as individuals are born with inalienable rights, so are States and the work to define that took centuries and was instituted via a series of views and reviews of philosophy that slowly moved into legal and diplomatic context until a well established law of nations was finally written down and discussed deeply for decades thereafter.

The actual book Law of Nations, by Emmerich de Vattel, is a deeply interesting text as it precedes the formation of the US and was utilized by William Blackstone to examine the English Common Law in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. I have examined the import of these texts in overview previously (here for a look at those plus the Black Book of the Admiralty) and how they influenced the creation of the US (article here), and were discussed by Federalists and the so-called 'Anti-Federalists' during the 1787-89 period. Emmerich de Vattel was, himself, working on the views of others, particularly Hugo Grotius, who had done On the Laws of War and Peace with the then understood law of nations. From these we can then look at Law of Nations and examine just what a Sovereign State is:

§ 1. Of the state, and of sovereignty

A NATION or a state is, as has been said at the beginning of this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined strength.

From the very design that induces a number of men to form a society which has its common interests, and which is to act in concert, it is necessary that there should be established a Public Authority, to order and direct what is to be done by each in relation to the end of the association. This political authority is the Sovereignty; and he or they who are invested with it are the Sovereign. (10)

§ 2. Authority of the body politic over the members.

It is evident, that, by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body, in every thing that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member, therefore, essentially belongs to the body politic, or state; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according as the society may have ordained.

That re-cap is necessary to remind individuals that a State is created by society and the people within it, and not the other way around. States do not suddenly form and gather people to them, and are, instead, an organic arising of creating a society in need of self-defense and mutual support. Any necessarily large society, and this has differed in history from few thousands to multiple millions, that seeks mutual support, accord and safety will then form a State to help direct that larger set of needs. Indeed, the system of Nations is the most liberal ever devised as it allows each and every society to give rise to its defense and self-government to its greater ends, something which no larger government than that society, commonly known as Empire, can do.

What is exemplary about Law of Nations is that it spends its time defining just what Sovereignty is, what government is, and what it should set about doing in a general way for its Nation. Almost the entirety of the first book is spent on this *alone* including the duty and obligations of the government to its people and the people to its government and the necessity of piety. Not left out are federal states or elective states, each of which are seen as legitimate though each having differing ways to mete out Sovereign powers that are in accord with the society under it. It is rigorous in this view because the basic and understood internal mechanisms of States were quite visible by that time, and the necessity of stating them so that governments could have understanding of what other governments (and their own) were doing and why gave insight into exactly how interactions could take place between States.

In that way Law of Nations, both in the written form and in the lower case form of common understanding of State to State contact, is 'voluntary' but the necessities of having a State make it descriptive of all States and how they work. If a State does not do these things then it is on its way to not being a State any longer. Thus, when looking at globalized insurgency against the Nation State concept, the key things it will attack are those systems of understanding both inside and amongst Nation States. To break down States any insurgency must attack the Law of Nations so as to remove its understanding from the body politic of Nations and from individuals. When that understanding is undermined, then States will begin to falter without internal knowledge and accountability for their actions. And those actions may be internal or external to the State, and the lack of accountability may likewise be internal, external or both, simultaneously.

From this attacking the Nation State system via COIN, as seen in FM3-24 can be seen in as a politico-military struggle consists of a set of political and military views that work in concert, they fall into categories of political, military, and fused politico-military. These are, in actuality, three separate axes that intersect at the common insurgency point of weakening or destabilizing the current ruling system. Each of these axes can work independently, as in political views that do not coincide with direct action military views, and yet aim at the same end, or together so that there is outright coordination between military and political activities, as in the various 'armed wings' of insurgent organizations.

When taken in the military realm, the original view of law of nations was to differentiate between Public War and Private War. Here Law of Nations is a touchstone for the international system of treaties, as it properly defines these two things as separate spheres of warfare in Book III:

§ 1. Definition of war.(136)

WAR is that state in which we prosecute our right by force. We also understand, by this term, the act itself, or the manner of prosecuting our right by force: but it is more conformable to general usage, and more proper in a treatise on the law of war, to understand this term in the sense we have annexed to it.

§ 2. Public war.(136)

Public war is that which takes place between nations or sovereigns, and which is carried on in the name of the public power, and by its order. This is the war we are here to consider: — private war, or that which is carried on between private individuals, belongs to the law of nature properly so called.

§ 3. Right of making war.(136)

In treating of the right to security (Book II. Chap. IV.), we have shown that nature gives men a right to employ force, when it is necessary for their defence, and for the preservation of their rights. This principle is generally acknowledged: reason demonstrates it; and nature herself has engraved it on the heart of man. Some fanatics indeed, taking in a literal sense the moderation recommended in the gospel, have adopted the strange fancy of suffering themselves to be massacred or plundered, rather than oppose force to violence. But we need not fear that this error will make any great progress. The generality of mankind will, of themselves, guard against its contagion — happy, if they as well knew how to keep within the just bounds which nature has set to a right that is granted only through necessity! To mark those just bounds, — and, by the rules of justice, equity, and humanity, to moderate the exercise of that harsh, though too often necessary right — is the intention of this third book.

§ 4. It belongs only to the sovereign power.(137)

As nature has given men no right to employ force, unless when it becomes necessary for self defence and the preservation of their rights (Book II. § 49, &c.), the inference is manifest, that, since the establishment of political societies, a right, so dangerous in its exercise, no longer remains with private persons except in those encounters where society cannot protect or defend them. In the bosom of society, the public authority decides all the disputes of the citizens, represses violence, and checks every attempt to do ourselves justice with our own hands. If a private person intends to prosecute his right against the subject of a foreign power, he may apply to the sovereign of his adversary, or to the magistrates invested with the public authority: and if he is denied justice by them, he must have recourse to his own sovereign, who is obliged to protect him. It would be too dangerous to allow every citizen the liberty of doing himself justice against foreigners; as, in that case, there would not be a single member of the state who might not involve it in war. And how could peace be preserved between nations, if it were in the power of every private individual to disturb it? A right of so momentous a nature, — the right of judging whether the nation has real grounds of complaint, whether she is authorized to employ force, and justifiable in taking up arms, whether prudence will admit of such a step, and whether the welfare of the state requires it, — that right, I say, can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign, her representative. It is doubtless one of those rights, without which there can be no salutary government, and which are therefore called rights of majesty (Book I. § 45).

Thus the sovereign power alone is possessed of authority to make war. But, as the different rights which constitute this power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may be separated or limited according to the will of the nation (Book I. § 31 and 45), it is from the particular constitution of each state, that we are to learn where the power resides, that is authorized to make war in the name of the society at large. The kings of England, whose power is in other respects so limited, have the right of making war and peace.1 Those of Sweden have lost it. The brilliant but ruinous exploits of Charles XII. sufficiently warranted the states of that kingdom to reserve to themselves a right of such importance to their safety.

A lengthy piece, but necessary, as it sets the bounds and limits for who can and cannot make war. Do note the relegation of those making Private War to the law of nature, which is a much rougher play of liberty that is only given when one is attacked. Those that operate outside of the Public sphere of State to State intercourse and diplomacy in this area are practicing Private War, not Public War, as they consider themselves to be beholden to no one in their assaults on Nations. No matter what the perceived foul, the perceived transgression, the perceived slight by an individual or people, waging war outside the Public sphere is Private War. Self-defense of communities is one, thing, but proceeding, from there, to counter-attack, unless all other forms of civilized protection are no longer available, is something that cannot be done.

This high right of a State is, actually, allowed to the States of the United States if the federal government cannot or will not respond to invasion or threat that will not brook delay as seen in Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution:

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

This language is a basic restatement of the autonomy of the States within the Union having given to the National government those things to protect the whole of the Union, but still giving those States the right to protect themselves during times of duress or federal neglect. At that point, when National government cannot or will not do its duty, that duty then devolves to the State(s) involved to defend themselves.

In the US system of government, the ability to distinguish between those making Public War and Private War has devolved upon the Commander in Chief with the input of the Congress on the treatment of those waging Public War. In Private War, however, the Laws of War break down as those waging it have no right to do so and are, thusly, outside of the framework of the Nation State system of interaction. This, too, is part of the law of nations view, again from Book III, here distinguishing lawful from unlawful war:

§ 67. It is to be distinguished from informal and unlawful war.

Legitimate and formal warfare must be carefully distinguished from those illegitimate and informal wars, or rather predatory expeditions, undertaken either without lawful authority or without apparent cause, as likewise without the usual formalities, and solely with a view to plunder. Grotius relates several instances of the latter.5 Such were the enterprises of the grandes compagnies which had assembled in France during the wars with the English, — armies of banditti, who ranged about Europe, purely for spoil and plunder: such were the cruises of the buccaneers, without commission, and in time of peace; and such in general are the depredations of pirates. To the same class belong almost all the expeditions of the Barbary corsairs: though authorized by a sovereign, they are undertaken without any apparent cause, and from no other motive than the lust of plunder. These two species of war, I say, — the lawful and the illegitimate, — are to be carefully distinguished, as the effects and the rights arising from each are very different.

§ 68. Grounds of this distinction.

In order fully to conceive the grounds of this distinction, it is necessary to recollect the nature and object of lawful war. It is only as the last remedy against obstinate injustice that the law of nature allows of war. Hence arise the rights which it gives, as we shall explain in the sequel: hence, likewise, the rules to be observed in it. Since it is equally possible that either of the parties may have right on his side, — and since, in consequence of the independence of nations, that point is not to be decided by others (§ 40), — the condition of the two enemies is the same, while the war lasts. Thus, when a nation, or a sovereign, has declared war against another sovereign on account of a difference arisen between them, their war is what among nations is called a lawful and formal war; and its effects are, by the voluntary law of nations, the same on both sides, independently of the justice of the cause, as we shall more fully show in the sequel.6 Nothing of this kind is the case in an informal and illegitimate war, which is more properly called depredation. Undertaken without any right, without even an apparent cause, it can be productive of no lawful effect, nor give any right to the author of it. A nation attacked by such sort of enemies is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules prescribed in formal warfare. She may treat them as robbers,(146a) The inhabitants of Geneva, after defeating the famous attempt to take their city by escalade,7 caused all the prisoners whom they took from the Savoyards on that occasion to be hanged up as robbers, who had come to attack them without cause and without a declaration of war. Nor were the Genevese censured for this proceeding, which would have been detested in a formal war.

This, one would think, is obvious about Nation State conduct and those individuals who move outside of the protection of the law of nations and into the law of nature: they have brought their ends upon themselves willingly. On the battlefield no Congress can or should attempt to break with this view, that those fighting, actively in combat or otherwise attempting to do so and then pass themselves off as mere civilians, are due to any recompense on the battlefield. Their ends are left up to the Commander of the Armies and the Navies, that being the Commander in Chief of the US forces. That singular individual is given play, here, as the Sovereign right of a Nation to deal with such outlaws is paramount for the protection of those soldiers operating by the formal rules of war. This is not only the view of the law of nations but has precedent in the United States. The following is exactly how Abraham Lincoln authorized the US Army to deal with things in the Field Manual - 100, of 1863-81, last reprinted in 1898:

Art. 82.

Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers - such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

Do note the language used to distinguish between normal soldiers, due the full treatment of lawful war, and those committing unlawful war. As President Lincoln established this as the law of nations instantiation by his powers of the Admiralty (to distinguish piracy from normal lawful raiders) and that of the Army, he is given the full panoply of determination on land and sea just who is and who is not legitimately waging war against the US. And the summary treatment of highway robbers or pirates, in those days, was no different than the Genevese visited upon those that attacked them unlawfully.

Also note that it is a perfect description of 'terrorist'.

With this we can now form the distinction between those who are 'Revolutionaries' and put on uniform, create government, and are accountable to their activities, from those that are mere insurgents who feel no compunction to be held accountable for anything they do and see themselves as above and beyond all law of man. Congress can create civil law to deal with these individuals, if they are caught outside of the battlefield after joining an organization actively waging Private War on the US. This hard and fast distinction between civil and military law has lasted for centuries and with good reason: it is needed to remove human predators from endangering society.

These definitions now help to define global insurgency as to what its activities will be:

  1. The attacking of any State via means of Private War.
  2. The attempt to remove the distinction between Public and Private War so as to return mankind to the Law of Nature.
  3. Aid given by donation, acquiescence, harboring, aiding, trading or in any way supporting in a physical or monetary way those waging Private War.

This covers immediate military concerns, in point 1, political concerns, in point 2, and their fusion in point 3. These are immediate insurgent views necessary for direct assault on the State system as described by law of nations views. There are also, however, the indirect assaults to weaken or delegitimize the State, and those are usually not just or only military in nature. Also the sorts of attacks are not limited to just externals of States but to the internal workings of them, as in classical insurgency against a State, but carried out as a systemic attack on the law of nations system.

Here the useful paradigm to think about is that promulgated by the 'Greens' groups and parties: "Think Global - Act Local".

The shift to push political systems to direct action is one that is militaristic in bent, if not in direct military support. Indeed, the actual push of 'agendas' may be to weaken or delegitimize State based military groups so as to weaken the defenses of the State for its people. Internally to Nation States, this is a process that seeks to polarize, delegitimize and then shift the power of the State from its normal, accountable, State based system to one that is amenable to the 'action' sought. Normal political based attacks against traditional State military systems then serves the wider purpose of State-to-State intercourse becoming less accountable by the weakening of States, themselves. That shift away from classically described State based systems to one that is pushed to direct action and control by those who have caused the polarization is then one of authoritarianism: by utilizing the push to action to circumvent normal accountability within the State, those seeking to undermine the Nation State system under the law of nations are furthering a non-State, authoritarian system as their outcome.

Classically, these are described as Empires in which a ruling individual or body has direct control over the lives of those within the State and allow only minor and usually ineffective means of feedback. That said, Empires are usually not alone in the world and have other States that they need to act with, thus the basic structure of law of nations re-asserts itself unless that Empire has overwhelming power or capability to over-run or absorb surrounding States. Those forces that seek to delegitimize internal order and accountability to create such an Empire often do not realize that this outcome, in which they will be forced by circumstances to either over-reach or recreate those structures, then puts in charge those least able or capable of shifting that chaos in the position of having to do so.

Classical Empires of Greece, Rome, Egypt, Babylon, and the multiple ones of China, all found that to keep the Empire stable amongst surrounding States (even barbaric ones with rudimentary State concepts) required the creation of internal systems to sustain the Empire, that tended towards direct action and cruelty. No matter how benign the group causing the problems may consider themselves to be, the actual need for a State is to utilize common power to restrict the excesses of society. Those in charge of Empires tend to see even modest dissent as an 'excess' and thus punishable by the State. To create a 'perfect Empire' requires near perfect isolation and no other meaningful State based contacts.

This has only been achieved in a meaningful way in the instances of the Greek Empire under Alexander, multiple instances in China, and Japan during its withdrawal from the world until the arrival of Perry. China, due to its geography, has been able to stage different forms of isolation and create long-lived bureaucracies that then become the true source of sustainment, no matter how much the Sun Emperor is worshipped. After the successful insurgency of post-WWII, China supplanted its traditional, Imperial based system with one that was Communist in name, but Fascistic in design. That traditional bureaucratic State re-asserted itself near instantaneously, and even with the charismatic Mao, it was the bureaucracy that continued on and is now the controlling organization of the State, no matter what the Party itself does. While China has had multiple internal revolts, it has normally taken exterior forces to remove one ruling elite and install another, and no matter who that elite *is* the bureaucratic necessities of the State shift the power from the Elite to the bureaucrat.

The Greek Empire lasted fleetingly under Alexander and, with his death, quickly decayed back to its constituent States. Here the military commanders quickly found themselves overwhelmed by culture and personal power, and those diplomats who had been put aside under Alexander (when not just eliminated) soon found their roles re-instated after his death. The Nations re-arose even if they all did speak Greek for a time, as their ethnic outlooks caused the welds formed by successful military campaigns to fracture under competition between the inheritors of the Empire. Alexander did not have the time nor foresight to create the bureaucracy that China found as necessary to establish internal control and cohesion over varying ethnic groups, so the actual time that the Greek Empire lasted was measured in years, not decades or centuries.

Japan, being an island State, found that its aristocratic class formed a powerful minority far larger in proportion to the peasant population than in Europe. While that class may only have been 1% or so in Europe, in Japan it was approximately 10% and swung that weight around heavily as the aristocracy was greatly militarized to start with. Japan's problem was in the adoption of gunpowder based weapons, and the democratizing effect of them as it takes far less skill to load, aim, shoot, clean and reload a firearm of that era than it did to wield a sword. When the commander of a military expedition in Korea called for more peasantry armed with muskets and no more Bushido, the campaign, itself, was brought back and Japan outlawed firearms as they were far too dangerous to the ruling class to have around. When a barely trained youngster can take down a veteran Bushido with one shot, the power shift had gone unpleasantly against the aristocracy and they would not, as in Europe, accede to this new reality. The centuries of isolation that followed could only happen with an island State able to enforce that isolation and ban trade.

None of these offer useful goals for the modern insurgent, anti-law of nations view, as they each are demonstrably delimiting by events (Alexander's unpreparedness and Geography in the cases of China and Japan) to allow useful replication in an outright form. Thus the modern insurgent must aim to create a global Empire with the necessity of a hard and powerful bureaucracy that, again, shifts control from the hands of the Elite that comes to power to the actual daily functionaries that wield this power. The pathways of computers, robotics and automation do not offer easy solutions to those seeking insurgent ends as these are all labor savings devices in a situation where having too much labor available is a problem. They may try to rely on the Orwellian concept of continual warfare, but they have so delegitimized that in their rise to power, that the actual functioning of the military, itself, comes into question. A shifting to the need of military force during their rise would obviate that, but would also destroy the facade of 'peaceful' and anti-military stances taken during that rise and cause a backlash. The last thing an insurgency wants when it is rising is a new insurgency against *it*, while battling against the COIN of the State(s) involved in trying to retain power.

State based backers of political insurgency against the law of nations and States, then, will garner the following characteristics:

  1. They will attack the legitimate use of arms and traditional military systems of the State. In doing this they will utilize any means necessary to counter support for States and claim that support, itself, to be Fascistic in nature even when it is adhering to classical, liberal State based needs.
  2. They will attack the legitimate functions of the State in areas relegated to the State at the National level. This will include such things as: diplomacy, commerce, immigration, and defense of the Nation.
  3. They will create a 'crisis atmosphere' about problems that cannot be solved, and yet they will call for them to be solved by the State. Thus, in any economic system which has any competition, the outcome is that there will be poor. To end that competition must be ended in the name of 'fairness' and 'equality'. As was done in Soviet Russia and modern China, so, too, will these insurgents call for the increase in State control to meet the exigencies of these 'crises' until the State, itself, becomes the only power allowed to deal with anything, and personal choice and accountability of the State is removed.
  4. On State-to-State functions of diplomacy, these insurgents will demand that treaties be seen either as 'worthless' or 'unequal' or that they must be adhered to when they go against the survival of the State. By changing views on the utility of diplomacy to fit immediate needs and 'crises' created by political views, these insurgents wish to demean and eliminate all normal State-to-State means of diplomatic recourse and normalization.
  5. On any military attempts to reign in other States, this will be depicted as 'imperialistic', 'fascistic', or 'totalitarian', even when all necessary law of nation safeguards have been satisfied. Because the organizing capacity of the military is both admired and feared, it must be destroyed by these insurgent views so as to remove the only effective organ of State-to-State accountability and engender more 'crises' and then claim that either military solutions are always in need, for those things that cannot be solved by military means, or openly attack those instances where all law of nations views are actually performed and to undermine them at every turn.
  6. In matters of trade, no ability of the State to leverage control over trade is supported and all attempts to make trade 'free' of any burdens of the State is supported. In this manner the normal classical liberal means of the State to express societal displeasure or gratitude is ended or undermined, so that trade will no longer serve as a function of State-to-State reciprocity and will always be open to any State no matter how bad or destructive it is.
  7. Insurgents will utilize ethnicity as trumping society and Nation, so that the needs of ethnic enclaves, even within States, are seen as 'more legitimate' than the States they are in. This is generally known as 'Balkanization' to fracture and remove traditional State means for societal adherence to a common ethos. By claiming this both within and amongst States, ethnicity is given as the only deciding factor, unless that actually supports a State or set of States, in which case it is decried as 'isolationism' or 'segregationist'.
  8. Immigration as the function of States is decried as 'discriminatory' and undermined by both State and international groups seeking to delegitimize the classical, western concepts of the State having power to enforce societal views on who can be naturalized into society and who cannot be accepted. By removing that legitimacy and forcing acceptance, the State is further weakened as a concept, until it can no longer control these things and is seen as illegitimate due to that lack of control.
  9. Religion, which as part of the Westphalian view is not to be controlled by the State, is then made into either a controlling State-based view. This is done either by trying to fuse religion with the State or supplanting traditional religions with the State, so that any religious view is automatically a political view. With this no aspect of religious life is outside the purview of the State to control.
  10. In all cases where the State is not given control over society, the political view is that the State must have this for general, nebulous 'good reasons' that fit certain 'crises' that are generated ad nauseam so as to justify the authoritarian views of those involved with promoting such 'crises' and views. Thus the 'ends' become the 'means' so that the activity, itself, is the justification for action and nothing higher is seen as legitimate for justifying action.

This listing is not and cannot be exhaustive, as any insurgency is to take up any means necessary to de-legitimize the State based system and the law of nations itself. Treaties are then put as something 'above the State' instead of merely being the contractual acceptance between States that can be broken by any State for classical, western law of nations reasons. In doing this the claim will be that such views are *supporting* these classical views, but then no actual tracing to such things as the law of nation, the laws of war or other such documents will be done and, instead, mere treaties or doctrinal works secondary to these founding works will be seen as primary.

A long-term insurgent campaign must remove these very works from normal public reading and understanding so that the public has little or no understanding of what classical western culture actually is, and can thus be swayed by rhetoric or hyperbole. By only being able to utilize secondary sources or claiming that there is some 'universal' set of rights that is not founded in the law of nature, laws of war and peace, laws of the admiralty, or the law of nations, can an insurgent campaign hope to be successful in the long run.

Further, science is seen as a tool to create society instead as a system of inquiry into the workings of nature. By trying to misplace the tools of physics, biology, chemistry and geology and fitting them into the non-scientific areas of sociology, psychology and politics, can these basic tools of creating a better world be corrupted and seen, then, as a source of ill instead of the creations of man able to ameliorate the problems of nature. Technology, then, becomes something to be decried as harming 'nature' even when the data will show otherwise. By using pseudo-scientific views of 'nature' and society that have no foundation in science but that have the trappings of science, can the insurgency have any hope of removing the few tools of technology and science available to the State for the betterment of its citizens. Here energy generation, in all cases save those supplied by nature directly, be seen as antithetical to the common use of ordinary citizens and any and all attempts to end such utilization must be pushed as ongoing 'crises'. Actual science, itself, is only used as trappings where it supports such views and then politically attacked when it does not do so.

These, then, are the forms of modern insurgency being waged against the classical, law of nations, Nation State system. It contains military parts (Private War going by the concepts of terrorism and piracy), political parts in support of removal of the legitimate State uses to uphold society (via political views such as Communism, Fascism, Progressivism, or anything which generally supports ideology over discourse and action over accountability), and the fusion of the two via 'political wings' of terror groups and 'action wings' of political groups.

This insurgency against the classical, western law of nations system has been brewing in forms of nihilism and totalitarianism for over a century and are now reaching fruition across the board to delegitimize the entirety of the Nation State system and call for global Empire. Those doing such calling have many voices: IslamoFascists, Progressivists of all stripes, those that promote economics as the only end to liberty, and those seeking to push ethnicity and its fusion with identity politics above the commonality of society to have a State. Be it Caliphate, Transnationalist, or Globalist in views, the concept of these being insurgents to the law of nations State based system are just the same. They will distort any text, any idea to reach their goal of a global Empire that will destroy individuality and put a single, ruling view in place of individual views and common accord amongst individuals.

To counter this requires a COIN campaign that counters it in particulars and changes the outlook of society to one that supports accountability and individualism along with the regularity of Nations as upholding the true diversity of societies on the planet.

That will be upcoming in future works.

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