Now, for your reading enjoyment the analysis of the summary of the NIE! No, that cannot be good at all: doing an analysis of a summary of a larger analysis and not having the larger amount of material available. So, to look at the NIE Key Judgments, what must be taken into account?
First and foremost it is a bland cross-agency summary of where the INTEL Community thinks things were as of MAR 2006. And as it is a set of Judgments on that intelligence information, it is summary in nature and an overview of the material.
Secondly, this is a high-level summary for an Executive and so must be short and easy to read. The President has daily IC briefings with his Cabinet officers and can get the daily work and updates as necessary. Every so often, probably quarterly, the IC does a summation of their work and then tells what is going on. Thus there will be little to NO backing evidence in the actual summation, but an overview of what the actual information hold.
Third, while it tries to be predictive, it is done so cautiously and must gain adherence from the Agencies involved. Further, Federal Agencies have a large amount of CYA involved, and so try not to 'make waves' or put forth partisan views, but offer the best analysis on the facts.
Fourth and finally, INTEL in all of its forms (HUMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, etc.) is never, ever certain and has a probability of being correct attached to it or likelihood of certainty. Thus any analysis, even one that is apparently 'slam dunk' is only in the 85-90% certainty range and is seen as conclusive as nothing else fits the overviews when pieced together. The whole of the information shows up much more than the pieces by themselves do. This is 'connecting the dots' to form the larger picture, so that a bunch of unconnected dots have inter-relationships and form a coherent whole.
This does mean that things can get cast into a view that is NOT as it appears due to unexpected connectedness, lack of connectivity or causality that is not there, but apparently *is* there. The art of INTEL analysis is to cast worst and best case scenarios and see what the outgrowths of those are and how well each fits with new and incoming data. These models of how relationships form, work and reach outwards are then reviewed and adjusted to take new facts into account. Often entire structures need to be removed and rethought because facts fully contradictory to the existing models and with a very high degree of reliability come to light which invalidates previous worst and best case scenarios.
With that viewpoint and knowledge that we are not privy to the underlying factual data, let us look at the NIE Key Judgments.
United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.
• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.
• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, could erode support for the jihadists.
al Qaeda has been hurt by the loss of upper level management in Pakistan, Afghanistan and lower level commanders in such places as Iraq and UK. As seen throughout the past few years a list of these individuals include: the top cyber expert, the top disguise expert, the top bomb making expert, and a number of INTEL and tactical organizers global operations. Regional and local al Qaeda operatives including in-nation terrorist organizers, financiers, and support groups have also been impacted. In many of these cases further fall out through lower echelons of the organization has caused localized 'roll-up' of al Qaeda operations.
The nature of al Qaeda is a distributed organization adhering to no Nation nor to any set region, but is global is scope and capability. Thus while more obvious cells in the Middle East become apparent through operations, the support of al Qaeda in Indonesia, Philippines, South America and increasingly in Kashmir in India is also going on. And it is the support internetworking of al Qaeda for groups like Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abbu Sayyef, Ansar al-Sunna, Ansar al-Islam, Moro Independent Front, GSPC in Algeria, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and PLO that make it a dangerous organization. This does *not* address the non-al Qaeda group Hezbollah, which is armed and funded by Iran and has made inroads into Lebanon, Syria, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. From that overview al Qaeda and *all* affiliated and non-affiliated groups are on the rise across the globe and have a sympathizer and support network that is present in nearly every Nation on the planet.
The spread of Islam is also spreading jihadism and violence with one of the main vectors being the prison systems of Nations, especially those secular Nations that allow religious practice and proselytizing within them. The US has seen a dramatic increase in the rise of Islam amongst the US prison population and the violent portion of Islam is very appealing to those that enjoy violence with a gloss of religiosity to it. Similarly this spread is happening amongst other regions in Africa, South America and Europe as violent jihadists get added into the regular prison population because of minor crimes being committed. This is a fast growing and spreading part of Islam that is encouraging jihadist outlook via appeals to the most violent people in the world: prisoners.
And as these native adherents of Islam move back into society, they spread Islam either by further proselytizing or threats and force. Because Islam makes no distinction between those brought 'to the fold' by violence instead of by choice, Islam spreads through terror, coercion and via normal individuals converting to it. Further as a conversion is seen as *permanent* any wishing to convert to a different religion later is targeted as an apostate.
Greater pluralism and better governance by Governments can do much to alleviate the social pressures leading to the spread of a violence oriented group within a larger religion. The number one largest cause for growth of Islam is that individuals are being oppressed by Governments and those Governments are seen as corrupt in their outlook and self-serving. Corruption and favoritism backed by Governmental force cause feelings of repression to grow and without any recourse via civil political means these individuals head towards mass movements for self-protection and then fighting the Government involved. In Europe in the post-WWI era the movements of Fascism, Communism and National Socialism were seen as ones that would be 'solutions' to dissolute democratic institutions and become 'saviors' for their Nations. In the post-WWII era, after the majority of colonies were divested from European powers, the governments left behind were seen as tainted and corrupt and many were overthrown and replaced with new and locally more corrupt governments. India is one of the few standouts in fighting sectarianism and offering a pluralistic approach to democracy that *is* responsive to the People. Autocracies in the Middle East along with dictatorships in Africa and South America saw the rise of National Socialist movements, Communist insurgents and, now, Islamic fundamentalists.
Do note that even *with* better and more responsive Governments, pluralism, and reforming of *all* of these things, violent jihadism spread through the prison system and inculcated by terrorist organizations will remain a major problem for the foreseeable future. And the Transnational forms of jihadism, especially that of al Qaeda and Hezbollah, and their Imperial viewpoints are ones that remain fully dangerous until the Transnational Terrorist support internetworking is addressed. Local law enforcement is a *start* of that, but it is no cure even in Western Nations in Europe, Australia, India, and Indonesia.
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
• We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.
• The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.
Added in to the first findings are these findings. Terrorist organizations, as seen, are decentralized in their nature and when not using the interconnectivity of al Qaeda or sympathetic Governments or affiliated organizations, they act independently and with their own viewpoints on means and method of operation and goals. This overall diffusion and 'call to jihad' is part of the overall increasing level of violence being spread via Islamic recruitment via terror organizations, fundamentalist sects such as the Wahhabi, and prisoner proselytizing. Put these together and violence from Islam increases as it spreads and becomes more dispersed and unfocused. By being more locally situated these terrorist organizations and violent jihadis are easier to recruit into larger plots and schema via al Qaeda and other, larger violent jihadist organizations.
As the US counters this internetworking via surveillance inside and outside the Homeland, cells will feel that they are being watched and attempt to gain favor and undermine such surveillance by claiming discrimination. By being 'resistance cells' they will gain in morale through cohesiveness and more rigid adherence to basic COINTEL methodology. When these groups are approached by larger, Transnational Terrorist organizations, they will then gain training and skills fostered by the larger interconnecting web and become more difficult to find and watch. This form of self-radicalization is inherent in any attempt to counter *any* resistance movement that turns to violence, be it the KKK, Black Panthers, Weather Underground, IRA, PLO, Hezbollah or al Qaeda. The roots of fundamentalist Islam spread the basis for violent jihad and the outgrowth of that root system is violent jihadist cells and terrorist organizations both locally and then internetworked globally.
With the spread of poor and repressed individuals from Islamic Nations to more affluent and open Western Nations, comes concepts of jihad, spreading the faith, plot-oriented views of governmental activities, and movements to not only self-ghettoize, but to form insular communities that attempt to force viewpoints on the larger Nation that they are existing within. In an attempt to flee to the West and losing moral and ethical guidance of their religion, more zealous forms of religion are brought in so that fundamentalism spreads to address the feelings of 'not fitting in' with these new societies they have moved to. Nativist Islamic terrorist organizations are thus born in second and third generation families that have not assimilated with the West and their children are now attempting to remake the West into something harsher and more repressive so that they can have a community that is simplistic in outlook and understanding.
The use of an anti-American agenda is natural for these groups as the United States is seen as the main source of 'moral decay' in the world and the worst opponent of Islam by not adhering to ANY religion and allowing individuals to freely worship as they choose. If the US were a harsh and repressive religious State, they would actually find more in commonality WITH the US than against it, as the basic understanding of 'enforced religion' is something that is being fostered within the Islamic diaspora. Fundamentalism, no matter how misguided or wrong-headed, is always a *first* source to turn to when individuals are no longer able to understand nor tolerate the changing world about them. Be it the fundamentalism of economics, Nationalism, religion or Imperialism, each of these gain adherents when people feel themselves to be repressed. By heading back to a 'truer' and 'closer to the source' form of belief, they hope to gain some clarity of insight on their position in the world. And when the world does not conform to those simplistic notions it is the world that is to blame, not those notions.
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.
• The Iraq conflict has become the 'cause celebre' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.
Here is a main point that those wishing to attack the Iraq policy attach to as an indicator that 'things are going to hell in a handbasket', to put it mildly. To understand what is being given to us to review, let us actually look at what is being said. The first sentence is in two parts and need some review in and of themselves.
By stating that jihad in Iraq is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders, many are pointing to this and saying: 'See? Surrender now, it is a failure.' But what, exactly, is the failure here? Look at the types of terrorism going on in Iraq and you will see targeting of civilians by bombings, shootings and other forms of mayhem. In particular unarmed men standing up for recruitment into the Army and Police are being targeted, but so are women and children. This is an outgrowth of the environment of jihad in Iraq: they can no longer easily target the US, Multi-National Forces, Iraqi Army, Iraqi National Guard, or Iraqi Police. In point of fact individual terrorist leaders both Nationally, Provincially and locally are rounded up on a regular and more frequent basis as the very terror they are using is losing support amongst those they have to live with. As Baghdad undergoes a process of cordon, clear, sweep and maintain with new forces, the violent jihadist groups are pushed to more violence on a 'use it or lose it' basis. Once a cell or cell system is penetrated, US and Iraqi Intel Units begin to unravel that system and find its lower level components and trace it back up the leadership. Muqtada al Sadr's organization is having to give up the violent aspects of their organization as it is NOW the main target of these operations. They have done that *before* but then it was an attempt to withdraw and regroup so as to 'fight another day'. This time their very home territory is undergoing the cleaning and sweeping and they are losing fighters and supporters at a high rate. If they wish to try and remain a political entity, they now *must* give up violence before they run out of PEOPLE.
Those 'experienced' jihadists that can actually escape Iraq have been fully trained. As butchers. Compare the standard jihadist attack in Iraq and contrast it to the standard al Qaeda attack. Iraqi terrorism is that of 'get it out the door quickly to kill as many people as fast as possible before we are caught'. That is the lesson being learned in Iraq by these fighters. al Qaeda, however, prefers the longer term approach building up to large, distributed attacks by cells well schooled in COINTEL techniques and patience. To actually *utilize* experienced jihadists from Iraq, they must undergo a thorough retraining so that they do not boil over the first five minutes into their first mission. They have been trained in exactly the *wrong* things to do from an al Qaeda viewpoint. Hezbollah is more willing to make use of such individuals, but mainly as inexperienced 'shock troops' against Israel. Hezbollah has demonstrated some military capability and fighting ability due to training by Iran and have a different outlook on jihad than do those 'experienced' Iraqi jihadists. These 'experienced' individuals will even have problems fitting into neighboring jihad movements and terrorist organizations as they are firstly outsiders and secondly unable to plan anything beyond mere butchery and attack.
To those wishing to say that this is making things worse on a global scale: you must now demonstrate HOW and WHY these 'experienced' jihadists in Iraq are so GOOD that they will be emulated elsewhere. These jihadists may, indeed, inspire other terror groups but what will they be inspiring? Mass distributed attacks on infrastructure including railways, skyscrapers and other critical facilities? Or will they turn to mere bombing and butchery which is relatively simple to do and gets you vehemently hated by those around you when THEY are the targets? These are very primitive KILLERS who mouth a religious agenda to excuse their acts. They are not skilled and competent terrorists able to target large numbers of people via a complex attack or series of attacks. Only when a society is in disarray *already* can they be somewhat effective and even *then* more localized groups will despise them. When Zarqawi attacked the wedding party in Jordan and tried to excuse it as something else, he was not looked upon with *favor* for his deeds.
Iraq has, indeed, become a 'cause celebre' for jihadis. And before that it was Israel and the Palestinians. And India in general and Kashmir in particular. And those awful Australians in Bali. And secular Turkey. And, in general, the entire world of Western Capitalism with its abundant decadence and idea that people should be free to worship as they want and act as they want so long as they do not harm others in doing so. Democratic governance is a 'cause celebre' for Fundamentalist Islam worldwide and continues to be so to this day. What this is indicative of is that the jihadist movements will use *anything* as a 'cause celebre' that is anti-Western, anti-US and anti-Israel or anti-anything they do not like that does not adhere to their fundamentalist view of the world.
For those that are actually able to survive Iraq, if they see that theirs was a fight that targeted Muslims, that went after innocent women and children, and was a jihad on the defenseless who already believe in some form of Islam, they may, indeed question if that is a way to *win* this fight. Is that any surprise?
We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.
• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq jihad;. (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims all of which jihadists exploit.
Surprisingly the jihadist movements have long memories and wish to fulfill their idealistic notion that wherever Islam once ruled it *continues* to rule and that is a major grievance against the West and those areas where it no longer rules. Some of *those* grievances go back hundreds of years and Osama bin Laden cites them for reasons al Qaeda would exist even if there were NO OTHERS. Corrupt Governments are a prime reason for the spread of jihadism amongst Muslim populations as they cannot believe that 'good muslims' would be repressive and, thus, their Government *must* be in a conspiracy against their own population. Autocratic and dictatorial rule are prime motivators for those 'not' in the ruling clique to fell dispossessed. That also happens to be the overwhelming majority of ALL societies under such rule. Highly brutal rule can gain submission, but deep seated resentments still fester as noted in Iraq where 30 years of brutal dictatorship did NOT remove religious grievances between sects.
The Iraqi jihad is seen as a something fueling jihadism. It is a 'cause celebre'. This point has been previously addressed.
The slow pace of reform on all fronts is an outgrowth of corrupt Governments that are repressive in nature and brutal in outlook. Those Governments offer scapegoats for problems in their Nations, Israel and the United States being two prime Nations cited for the incredibly poor capability of those Governments to actually bring prosperity to their people. It must be a *conspiracy*. Until the people notice that those in Government seem to get disproportionately rich compared to anyone else in the population. Then they posit that their Government is in conspiracy against them. It IS. All by itself, that ruling clique is in a conspiracy to remain in power and profit from it. That is what is known as dictatorial or autocratic rule. It is self-defining.
The United States is cited as bad for its licentious behavior, its non-adherence to Islam, the fact that it is open and allows all people to worship freely without coercion, that it is rich all out of proportion to other Nations. These repressed people see opulence amongst the infidels and cannot understand it and so come to hate it. They do not see that their own Governments are telling them these things to misdirect their anger *away* from their local autocrats and dictators and kings and princes. So long as that misdirection can continue safely these Governments are temporarily secure, until such time as fundamentalist religious movements turn violently against them.
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists. radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
• The jihadists greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
• Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.
How the these Islamic based Transnational Terrorist movements are limited are given here in this section. Muslim-related conflicts include all those that can be cast by radical and extremist Islamic groups as being an 'affront to Islam'. Like Danish Cartoons, the Pope speaking about the viewpoint of a previous era, like a Koran receiving an ill-watering. Yes, those are used to fuel jihadism and bad feelings. Imams issue fatwas and people rise up to call for 'death to the Infidel'. Again. And again. And again. Perhaps these overly zealous individuals can just do a recording and hit the 'play' button from now on and just let the recording speak of their fervent hatred of any mere hint or dust mote of criticism against Islam. That would save time, effort and basically achieve the exact same results, save for a few fewer heart attacks by those getting so worked up.
I would *love* to hear from the moderate voices of Islam. By remaining silent and speaking out only in their enclaves and mosques and NOT in the public forum, they are seen as giving tacit assent to jihadism. If you do not speak up for your beliefs they will be hijacked by those willing to do so. If those moderate muslims fear for their lives, then it is *really* time to take this concept of 'give me liberty or give me death' thing seriously. Otherwise the right to speak out will be lost by NEGLECT.
If shari'a law is so unpopular then it is best to repudiate it for something more amenable to the modern world and tell the world that shari'a law is NOT want you want for the entire world. This, again, cannot ONLY be spoken of in mosques, but must come into the public forum. Whenever some hot head condemns their treatment in the west for using shari'a law as their shield which they hide behind, their fellow muslims must speak out against that and point out that there is a law common to EVERYONE that must be adhered to and not some 11th century conception that was barely fit for desert dwellers and has little connection to the modern world.
When moderate muslims speak out about these things the MSM should cover THEM. Repeatedly. And point to their courage and bravery and steadfastness in upholding the rights of man within and amongst Nations. Of course that would be *supporting* liberty and freedom, which seems to be out of fashion these days.
The use of the MSM is *part* of this as reporters must come to understand that in becoming partisan against the United States and the West, they are deriding freedom and liberty and giving vent to the idea that 'slavery is ok to some societies'. Those that see submission to Islam as 'ok' on a Global Basis want an Empire out of the deal and there will be no liberty and freedom for individuals under that. Partisan attacks are undermining the foundations of Western society and attempting to replace it with something that has proven to be of no good to mankind: Empire. If this support for those promulgating anti-Western, anti-democratic and anti-individualist ideals continue, then what you will get is the negation of all the rights that have been fought for over the last few centuries.
If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.
Yes, progress requires tearing down the wonderful pre-9/11 status quo world. That was the world that got lack of response to terrorist attacks again and again until they reached the shores of the United States multiple times. To get freedom, liberty and personal responsibility and individual rights, the systems of autocracy and dictatorship must go down either via gradual reform or revolution. Revolutions can be hijacked by those elements most willing to kill and exploit people and that is radical Islam in this day and age. All politics *must* become local for freedom to advance and for governments to be held accountable for their actions by their People. No wonderful 'international court' or 'larger system of governments' can work that out. If you have worn a 'one-size fits all' garment you also know it corollary: 'but fits NONE well'. There is no way to make governments accountable to their people save by reforming them into a process of gradual decentralization and distributed governance until the People are in control and their governments held accountable to THEM, not to some arbitrary Caliph, Dictator, Aristocrat or Bureaucrat. Things will get nasty in many instances. Welcome to the concept of 'change' which requires shaking up how we approach problems. Those wishing to RUN from this are saying that we cannot change things for the BETTER and must accept defeat as the world slides down into tyrannical rule. Into Empire. Which will come knocking on Our doors if we do not help to counter it NOW. The only way to demonstrate how this works is to be there and HELP, not to run away in fear and denial. People will die from this, get used to it. Standing up FOR liberty always seems to bring out tyrants who want no part of it and will expend lives to stop it. That is why the tree of freedom is nourished by the blood of tyrants and patriots. Without an effort to *stop* tyranny, freedom will die.
Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.
• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.
• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.
• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.
The actual extent of the Zarqawi network sans Zarqawi and its actual level of integration with al Qaeda as a whole is unknown. This section is OBE: overtaken by events. However, the one pertinent part of what happens when upper al Qaeda leadership is removed is still operational. We do not know if there is a stand-by or secondary plan for leadership succession. There probably is *not* as anyone who held such a plan would then be in a prime position to work against the al Qaeda leadership so as to gain power. Thus factionalization and fracturing of the al Qaeda organization after the removal of top leadership is not only possible but likely. Without that coordinating leadership, the remaining groups would need time to work out a system of better internetworking to attempt al Qaeda level attacks. They have left a template behind for that and how to operationally move into Imperialism via their manuals. That sort of thing requires good funding on a Transnational scale and the question of how much of the financial network would be rolled up is *also* problematical. Much will be chaotic at such a time. We had best be ready to exploit that chaos.
The other thing of note is that al Qaeda has been able to recruit some local Iraqis into their operations under Zarqawi. These are, I believe, some of the ones that have been picked up since the loss of Zarqawi, so the ability of Iraqis to actually manage terrorism on their own without better organizational oversight has yet to be proven. Not mentioned is are the Mehdi Army under al Sadr, which have been getting backing from Iran. The number of Iranian fighters captured in Iraq, plus the cross-border supply of al Sadr's group leads to an analysis that while there is some local management of them, the general marching orders are coming from elsewhere. Which could help to explain why al Sadr is trying to reach a compromise with the government as his own skin is in the balance between continued fighting and retreat to Iran. Life expectancy for either may be a relatively low one.
Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones.
This would be such things as the Madrid commuter rail bombing in 2004, which has not been specifically pinned down, but prime suspects include everything from home-inspired islamic terrorists to Moroccan Islamic terror groups. Also note the increase of the use of sectarian violence in places like Darfur, which had not been traditional hotbeds of Islamic radicalism, and the spread of Hezbollah to Venezuela after firmly taking root in Argentina and Brazil. Further are the more recent attacks on Sweden which has *never* been a confrontational place for Islam in the modern era and one must go back to the Byzantine Empire to find even peripheral involvement with that. And even the western provinces in China are seeing some stirrings of unrest by Islamic groups, so this is not only an outlook or an opinion at this point, but a forecasting of actual happenings.
These groups are not al Qaeda but will pose just as much a long-term threat to the US as al Qaeda does today without any concerted effort against them by the West or the Nation State system internationally.
We judge that most jihadist groups - both well-known and newly formed - will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.
• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.
Here is the outlook for Transnational Terrorism by jihadist groups: they will continue on the one-man, one-bomb, one-event system on civilians for the near to mid-term future, especially in cities. Iraqi butchers will be seen as a good candidate for these groups as these will be individuals without scruples and will attack anyone. And they are all looking for bigger, better and nastier weapons of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability. That is their method and means of asymmetrical warfare and has been for decades.
While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists.
State sponsors of terrorism will continue to feed their most loved allies in this, but that capability will pass throughout the entire network of Transnational Terrorists and raise the overall capabilities of them on a global basis. Weaker Nations that cannot enforce their borders nor police themselves well will be prime areas for terrorists to hide and seek cover, and then use these Nations as shields for their activities. Like, say, Lebanon. Or Russia. Or the northern provinces of Pakistan. Or small islands in Oceania. Or the failed and turbulent Nations in Africa and the Balkans. Or the weak National governments of South and Central America that have been undermined by narcoterrorism, emerald smuggling, and more localized terrorist or mafia organizations.
Or the porous borders of the United States and its weak Federal Government.
Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.
• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.
And this last one I
address fully in this article because it is an outlook paragraph... and if you didn't like how the last sentence of that previous assessment went, then you will like this even less.
