tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24766932.post3101307126168814319..comments2023-02-17T14:59:05.164ZComments on The Jacksonian Party: The NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and CapabilitiesA Jacksonianhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07607888697879327120noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24766932.post-32233787112242498932007-12-04T16:27:00.000Z2007-12-04T16:27:00.000ZThat is an interesting problem to speculate on wit...That is an interesting problem to speculate on with respect to the installation. Iran, before the late 1990's had not made nuclear separators 'in house': they bought them via the AQ Khan ring. One speculation, that I would place a bit of review on, is that Iran, having bought a few of the Mitutoyo devices decided to DIY without background in that. Copy the Mitutoyo separators and mass produce (well, at least the the extent that Iran can do so).<BR/><BR/>As with all products rushed to market, these separators had some problems... really, reverse-engineering has not been an Iranian forte, or else they would have done so with our F-14s ages ago... why tout such numbers and then put it offline? Probably they weren't working to high enough efficiency... that is pure speculation, of course, but fits with the timeline. Demo models often will not show problems in regular production models.<BR/><BR/>Counting on those coming on-line, to much fanfare, no doubt, they shipped the rest of the Mitutoyo separators to Syria. Syria, used to working on shoestrings, set them up either at the Cerin facility or at the brand-spanking new, ultra secret al-Baida site, with bets being on the latter. Since mid-2002 to early 2003 al-Baida has been quietly unnoticed and yet rumored to be the reception point for Saddam's WMD work. While Iran has been going the high production route, Syria has been taking the slow, methodical slow production route and were, in-house, readying a bomb design/test facility that Israel bombed.<BR/><BR/>So, while Iran went 'off-line' its expertise shifted to Syria to start final materials prep and building of the facility for bomb design and analysis. This fits that NIE timeline and is from known events before the publication of the NIE. For this Iran would have kept a few Mitutoyo units, Syria would get the bulk and begin slow processing on a 'back-up' plan. Iran faces problems with its separators and shuts them down, trying to figure out what went wrong.<BR/><BR/>Israel, seeing an increase in work at the suspected nuclear facility and hearing the report mentioned by Robison (from separate sources, no doubt) decide to put the kibosh on the finishing facility. That still leaves the deeply protected al-Baida facility which is hard rock buried and in that heavily defended air corridor between Damascus, Tal Snan and Al-Safira.<BR/><BR/>Ever wonder *why* the Bekaa was no longer 'the most heavily protected air corridor on Earth'? The emplacements and equipment were most likely relocated in and around al-Baida.<BR/><BR/>The NIE has been absolutely truthful, but did not address the entire problem and, as Israel caught us by surprise, the IC has a massive blind-spot in it. Iran is a threat... but it is not working alone and we must never, ever forget that.A Jacksonianhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07607888697879327120noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24766932.post-26016286152017039382007-12-04T15:38:00.000Z2007-12-04T15:38:00.000ZI found this statement in the NIE to be interestin...I found this statement in the NIE to be interesting:<BR/><BR/><I>Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.</I><BR/><BR/>This almost sounds like the Iranians have had some sort of major technical screwup, maybe on the same order as the North Korean fissile fizzle.<BR/><BR/>All in all it's a very puzzling document. Seems to me that there are two major questions:<BR/><BR/>1) Why was it released publicly?<BR/><BR/>2) Assuming it's correct, what are the Iranians thinking by flaunting the program?<BR/><BR/>The answer to the first question may simply be that it was impossible to keep secret, given that its main consumer was Congress. Maybe the administration finally has acquired enough PR and basic communication smarts to get out in front of the story.<BR/><BR/>But another possiblity is that the NIE is intended to send a message to the Iranians. What would that message be? How 'bout, "We're on to you and we know you've been bluffing us."<BR/><BR/>Which brings us to the second question: What the hell were the Iranians thinking? Assuming that the NIE is an accurate assessment (of reality, that is--it's almost for-sure that it really does represent the consensus of the IC), the implication is that the Iranians, at not inconsiderable cost to their national prestige and economic well-being, have been engaging in a huge, multi-billion dollar bluff. What could justify such enormous cost?<BR/><BR/>I can only think of one thing: They want the US or Israel to attack them. They know that any raid on the country will cost them their entire air-defense system and all of their known nuke sites, but probably won't generate much more in the way of casualties or infrastructure damage.<BR/><BR/>But the immediate effect of such an attack will be to unify the Iranian people and rally them to the government's side. All dissent will immediately cease. The government will have <I>carte blanche</I> to round up even the most benign troublemakers and dispose of them. The Arab world will ease off on Iran and may even make common cause with it against the US and Israel.<BR/><BR/>This is obviously a remarkably paranoid interpretation of the facts and, if true, represents a gamble that makes the stuff that Saddam did look like conservative statecraft. I just can't think of another scenario that fits the facts, assuming the NIE is correct.<BR/><BR/>If this is correct, the implication is that the mullahs and our little friend Mahmoud must be in dire straits. If the regime is that fragile, we can afford simply to keep the pressure on and they'll either collapse or liberalize in short order.<BR/><BR/>Of course, the NIE may not be correct, in which case we are now, by dint of its release, committed to allowing the Iranians to complete their program and acquire at least a couple of nukes. But I'm having trouble believing that something this earthshaking would come out without the IC being awfully careful. Even given their perverse pride in appearing to be as incompetent as possible, getting this one wrong would prove to be the end of the American intelligence community as we know it. There are too many bureaucratic necks on the line.<BR/><BR/>Very strange.TheRadicalModeratehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04671143818738683349noreply@blogger.com